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ABSTRACT
The Impacts of the Gulf War on the U.S. Defense Industry
Ömer Faruk CANTENAR 
Faculty of Business Administration 
Supervisor; Asst. Prof. Dr. Zeynep ÖNDER
SEPTEMBER 2000
In this study, the military intervention of the U.S to the Gulf Crises is taken as 
a major event and the impact of this event on the U.S defense stocks is examined by 
using event study methodology. The sample includes thirty-nine defense firms 
selected from the U.S Department of Defense top contractors list. The analysis of the 
abnormal returns on these defense stocks shows that the U.S. military intervention to 
the Gulf crises affects these stocks significantly and positively both in the short-term 
and in the long-term. The univariate analysis indicates that stock returns of defense 
firms are affected differently from this war depending on their defense dependency 
and market value. There exists a positive relationship between defense dependency 
and abnormal returns of the defense firms, controlling for the size of the firm.
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Körfez Savaşı’nın Amerikan Savunma Sanayine Etkisi
Ömer Faruk CANTENAR 
İşletme Fakültesi
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd.Doç.Dr. Zeynep ÖNDER 
EYLÜL 2000
Bu çalışmada ABD'nin Körfez Krizi'ne askeri müdahalesi "makro" olay 
olarak ele alınmış ve bu makro olayın ABD savunma sanayi hisselerine etkisi "olay 
etki çalışması" (event study) yöntemi kullanılarak incelenmiştir. Amerikan Savunma 
Bakanlığının en büyük 100 savunma şirketi içinden seçilen 39 firma üzerinde yapılan 
inceleme sonucunda, Körfez Savaşı’nın ardından bu şirket hisselerinin kısa ve uzun 
dönemde positif ve belirgin bir getiri sağladıkları tesbit edilmiştir. Ayrıca, "Savunma 
bağımlılığı" (savuma gelirieri/toplam gelirler) fazla olan şirketlerin hisse senetlerinin 
getirisinin savunma bağımlılığı az olanların getirisinden daha fazla olduğu ve pazar 
değeri düşük olan savunma şirket hisselerinin yüksek pazar değerine sahip hisselere 
kıyasla daha fazla getiri sağladıkları ve her iki sonucunda, istatistiksel olarak belirgin 
olduğu gözlenmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler; Olay etki çalışması. Savunma Sanayii, Savunma Şirketleri, 
Savaş etkisi
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INTRODUCTION
In the 1980s defense spending of the U.S. as percent of GNP reached the 
highest point after the Wold War II. The major motive for this high ratio was Soviet 
threat. Since the end of Cold War, the spending for the security has became a major 
issue which has taken too much criticism. The breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and “the definitive end of Cold War have led many 
governments to undertake substantial cuts in defense spending” (Bitzinger, 1994). 
After Cold War ended, the U.S. defense needs were seemed unclear. But it was 
believed that “Now it was safe to contemplate very substantial reduction in defense 
spending” (Brown and Stevens, 1992). What did this statement mean for the U.S. 
defense contractor firms? It means fewer sales to the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD) and less profit and less investment for the future defense related areas.
When international situation eases, there is a belief that the demand for 
military equipment will decrease. The decline in demand for these products and the 
government cuts in defense spending will shrink the market, weakening the defense 
firms. Therefore, the decrease in defense firms’ revenues and profits might create 
serious problems to the future performance of the firms in defense industry.
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However, the break up of the Gulf War in January 1991 created new 
opportunities for the defense industry. International weapon sales of the U.S. defense
firms increased substantially after the war. Besides, defense companies gave 
contractor support for their products used in the war. Lastly, they took new orders to 
fill over reduced missiles and all kind of ammunition.
This study examines the impact of the Gulf War on the U.S. defense industry' 
stocks. Since this war created a chance for the defense firms to increase their future 
performance, this analysis also provides a test of market efficiency. If the market is 
semi-strong form efficient, investors will predict the improvements in the future 
performance of the defense-related firms and react positively. In the study, the U.S. 
military intervention to the Gulf Crises is taken as an exogenous macro event and 
whether defense firms are positively affected from this event is investigated by 
employing event study methodology. In addition, whether two firm characteristics, 
defense dependency and size, are important in explaining the impact of war is 
examined by using univariate and multivariate analyses.
An overview of the U.S. defense industry and the impacts of Gulf War on the 
industry are given in the next chapter. The third chapter discusses event study 
concept and presents the findings of similar war-related researches. The fourth 
chapter reports the hypotheses and describes the methodology and data used in the 
study. The fifth chapter presents the results of the empirical research. The last 
chapter gives an overall conclusion of the study and recommendations for the future 
researches in this area.
CHAPTER n
THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRY, DEFENSE SPENDING AND
THE GULF WAR
National defense is a very critical issue for many countries and it has no other 
alternatives. Defense spending takes a big share of gross national product (GNP) for 
the most countries. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), total world military expenditure is roughly $780 billion for the year 1999. It 
represents a significant share of world economic resources: 2.6% of world GNP. The 
U.S. has the highest figure in defense expenditure with a share of 36% of the world 
defense spending (SIPRI Yearbook 2000).
Defense industry mostly requires sophisticated technology. That is why dollar 
amount of investment in the defense industry and the cost of products in that industry 
are extremely high. Since the United States is the world leader in military 
technology, the U.S. defense firms are the main suppliers for the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) and for the most of the world.
Despite the high cost of the defense, the U.S. Defense Industry helped win 
the cold war. During the Cold War, the following policy was valid: “when it came to 
buying national security for the U.S, money was no object”. In addition to national 
security, the U.S. firms in the defense industry has applied their research and
development activity and their technology for the development of telecommunication 
and space activities (Augustine, 1997).
After the Cold War, the defense companies have confronted the loss of more 
than 50% of their market share and defense procurement has declined by more than 
60% in constant dollars between 1989 and 1997 (Augustine, 1997). Therefore, 
defense dependency at corporate level increased the vulnerability of the company, its 
managers and its shareholders.
In 1990, while U.S. defense firms were seeking solutions to increase their 
weapon sales, the Persian Gulf War was started. During this war if the U.S. made 
weapons were used effectively, this would create an opportunity for the defense 
firms to sell their products internationally. They thought that the market for the U.S. 
weapons could expand since the other countries might decide to purchase these 
systems or increase the amount of their orders after seeing their effectiveness.
This expectation of the defense firms became reality. The superior 
performance of the U.S. weapons in the Persian Gulf War has increased foreign 
demand for them. According to Bitzinger (1994), in 1992, just one year after the Gulf 
War, American arms producers filled over $28 billion worth of overseas orders for 
military equipment while they were only $12 billion in 1991. Moreover, the U.S. 
arms transfer agreements reached $32 billion in 1993. Keller (1995) stated that in the 
year following Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. negotiated $22.5 billion in arms 
sales to the Middle East alone. According to Jane’s Information Group estimates, the 
Gulf states ordered around $32 billion worth of military equipment from the U.S. in 
1991 and 1992.
Beaher (1994) states that the circumstances after the Gulf War caused a huge 
arms transfer into the region, boosting U.S. defense industries that fallen on hard 
times since the end of cold war. He also says that Gulf States not only did pay most 
of the costs incurred by the coalition allies in prosecuting the war, they also ordered 
huge amounts of weaponary for their military.'
The intensive use of high-tech weapons and systems was the key factor for 
success in Gulf War. A Nato official explains this intensity by saying that “In Desert 
Storm we were flying 1600 sorties a day”'  (Momocco, Fulghum and Wall, 1999).
The expense of the total Gulf War, according to the DoD estimation, was $61 
billion. The largest single expense of the war ($18 billion of this figure) was for the 
spare parts and contractor support. There were numerous technical teams and 
representatives in the Gulf from various companies such as Northrop Corp., Huges 
Aircraft Co., Martin Marietta Corp., and Gruman. They were working in the back 
shop of their weapon systems and supplying technical support in order to operate 
these systems more effectively (Zorpette and Glean, 1991:40-42).
’ For example, Kuwait rewarded all its allies with military equipment orders. After the war Kuwait 
Government separated $11.7 billion for this purpose over 12 years. The first order went to the U.S. in 
October 1992 when General Dynamics won the contract to build 218 M1A2 Abrams main battle tank 
for SI.8 billion. From United Kingdom Kuwait ordered 254 GKN defense Desert Warrior armoured 
fighting vehicles, worth $500 million.
Bahrain was also one of the buyers from U.S., FFG-7 frigates for Navy and M60A3 main battle tanks 
and Multiple Rocket Launcher System for Army. United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia ordered 
Aphache helicopters from McDonnell Dougles. Saudi Arabia has taken 315 M1A2 main battle tanks 
and has an option on another 150. Saudi Land Forces also bought 400 M2A2 Bradley vehicles, and 
ordered 1117 light armoured vehicles from General Motor (Beaher, 1994).
* The figures about the amount of ammunitions used in this war show this intensity as well; “In Gulf 
War 52(Ю0 air-to-surface sorties delivered approximately 210000 unguided bombs, 9300 guided 
bombs. 5400 guided air-to-surface missiles and 2000 anti-radar missiles; American forces also hurled 
more than 300 cruise missiles at the enemy." (Cohen, 1994; p. 110)
The total cost of all bombs and missiles used was $2.2 billion. Although 90 
percent of the items dropped were unguided bombs, about 80 percent of the cost of 
all items dropped were guided bombs. The average cost of an unguided bomb was 
$2,057, while the average cost of a guided bomb was $31,918. Most of these bombs 
were produced by defense contractors (Dunnigan, 1996:135). The cost to fill the 
reduced inventory of these smart bombs and missiles was also high. Although these 
were costs for the DoD, they were the gains of its contractors.
Based on this discussion, three favourable situations for the U.S. defense 
industry after the Gulf War can be summarized as follows:
1. The superiority of the U.S. weapons in this war made U.S. defense firms 
to sell their products in international markets.
2. U.S. defense firms got the lion’s share from the Gulf War expenditure by 
selling spare parts and contractor support services for the U.S military.
3. They also got new orders of ammunitions, guided and unguided bombs 
and missiles to the increase the lowered inventory of U.S. military.
All of them should lead to increa.se in stock price of these contractors because 
those are the conditions which will increase their revenues and expected profits, 
leading to increase in their future growth rates. If the market is efficient, it should 
anticipate this and react by increasing the stock prices of defense firms right after the 
beginning of the Gulf War.
CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, first, the market efficiency concept and event study 
methodology are briefly summarized. Then, the outcomes of previous researches that 
examine the impact of the major events including military actions on the defense- 
related stocks are presented.
Market Efficiency
Many studies have been done to test empirically and to understand 
theoretically the efficiency of financial markets. By the term efficient security 
market, financial economists mean a market where security prices are equal to the 
present values of their future prospects, assuming that information is widely and 
costlessly available, all investors are good analysts and they adjust their holdings 
appropriately. In other words, in an efficient security market, stock prices fully 
reflect all available information that is relevant to the determination of values. So, in 
an efficient market, buying or selling of any security at the prevailing market price 
never results in a positive “net present value” (NPV) transaction (Brealey and Myers, 
1996; Tini? and West, 1979).
Efficiency implies that investors coirectly anticipate the true expected returns 
(Lwellen and Shanken, 1998). If stock prices already reflect all predictable 
information, then stock price changes must reflect only the unpredictable. If all 
publicly available information is reflected so quickly in the security prices in an 
efficient market, investors can earn abnormal return in these markets only by chance.
In his seminar paper. Fama (1970) discusses three forms of market efficiency 
depending on the information reflected in stock prices: weak form, semi-strong form 
and strong form. According to him, weak-form efficiency implies that current prices 
reflect past prices, therefore past prices can not be used to predict future returns. 
Semi-strong form efficiency implies that security prices reflect all of the available 
public information. In strong-form efficient markets, even investors' private 
information are considered to be fully reflected in market prices. Since his study, 
many researchers have tested these three forms of efficiency for several financial 
markets. After 20 years, Fama (1990) renamed his three classifications ba.sed on the 
existent tests of three-forms of efficiency. These are: (1) Te.sts for return 
predictability, (2) Event studies, (3) Tests for private information. The first type of 
tests examines whether returns are predictable from past returns and dividend yields. 
The second type, event studies, tries to measure impacts of a particular event on 
stock returns by examining abnormal returns around the specific event. Finally, 
private information tests check whether corporate insiders have private information 
that is not fully reflected in prices. In this study, event study methodology is used. 
Therefore, it is explained in detail in the next section.
Event Studies
Fuller and Farrell (1987) define event studies as “studies which are concerned 
with measuring abnormal returns around the date of a particular tj'pe of event.” The 
main theme beyond the event study methodology is to assess the impact of firm 
specific or marketwide events on an individual firm, or an individual industry, or on 
the market as a whole. It is a test of semi-strong form efficiency assuming that these 
events are public information. The announcements of these events should be 
reflected in prices immediately in an efficient market.
Event study methodology was introduced by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll 
(FTJR) (1969). According to Binder (1998), FFJR paper started a methodological 
revolution in finance, accounting and economics and "it has been widely used in 
these disciplines to examine security price behavior around events". Especially the 
introduction of powerful computers and the availability of the historical data 
accelerated their usage (Fama, 1990).
Event studies have been applied to a variety of firm specific and economy 
wide events. Some examples include mergers and acquisitions, earning 
announcements, issues of new debt or equity and announcements of macroeconomic 
variables such as inflation, economic growth or trade deficit (Mackinley, 1997).
In addition to the use of event study as a measure of market efficiency, 
Henderson (1990) stated two other uses of event studies; information value and 
metric explanation. As it was stated above, market efficiency studies try to measure
how quickly and correctly the market reacts to a particular type of new information. 
Information value studies try to find which company returns are affected from this 
new information. Metric explanation studies try to explain the metrics (extra returns) 
by dividing the sample into various samples and then investigating whether the 
unusual element of returns differed among subsamples.
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) studied the usefulness of event studies with 
monthly, weekly and daily data. If an examined event is dated to a day, it is possible 
to get the precise measure of the stock price adjustment to this specific daily event. 
Therefore, event studies on daily returns can give a clear picture of the speed of 
adjustment of prices to related information (Fama, 1990).
Brown and Warner (1985) stated some problems in using daily returns. They 
found that these few problems could not present obstacles for daily data usage in 
event studies. Binder (1998:116) also supports this idea:
"These statistical problems are "solvable" in one way or another.
Often many of the problems can simply be ignored, because, in
practice they are quite minor."
Although there are several event studies examining the reaction of the stock 
prices to the company specific and macroeconomic events, becau.se of the nature of 
this study the next section summarizes only the literature about the impacts of events 
including military action on the stock prices of defense firms and the market as a 
whole.
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Studies Examining the Impacts of Wars and Military Actions
Several studies have examined the effects of a wide variety of major events 
that affect all of the stocks ranging from wars to presidential elections. These events 
can be considered exogenous. For example, Niederhofler (1971) investigated the 
impacts of 432 world events, including natural disasters, military actions, legislative 
acts, election results and the deaths of prominent individuals. He studied the 
percentage changes in Dow Jones Industrial Average around these events. According 
to this study, market discriminated those events as good or bad. Niederhofler 
reported that the market overreacted to military events which were perceived to be 
bad, and then it readjusted in a positive direction.
Few studies have accounted for the possibility that stocks in different 
industries might respond differently to the same events. For example, Homaifar, 
Randolph, Helms and Haddad (1988) examined the effect of presidential elections on 
the stock returns of defense-related industries. Their findings supported the 
hypothesis that the defense industiy' stocks had significant excess returns after the 
election of a candidate supporting major increases in defense spending. The market 
thought that new administration would increase defense spending, causing above 
average earnings for companies that are suppliers to the Department of Defense. 
However, they also observed that defense-related stocks had statistically significant 
negative excess returns on the day following the election of Democratic presidents 
who generally pursued low defense spending policy.
Maloney and Mulherin (1998) investigated the impact of the Challenger crash 
on stock returns. They examined only returns on the stocks of the companies which
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were either the makers of the shuttle or within the management of shuttle ground 
support. Surely, those companies were from defense industry; Rockwell 
International, Lockheed, Martin Marietta and Morton Thikol. They found significant 
support for market efficiency. They observed that the market defined the responsible 
party within minutes, which was Morton Thikol, although the government 
investigation took five months to find the real cause behind the explosion. After the 
crash news reached the market, shares of four firms decreased sharply. The stock 
prices of three firms were recovered in two months while Morton Thikol share price 
had the worst decline on the crash day, stayed relatively the same and did not recover 
in that two months period.
A few studies have examined the impact of wars or war-related events on 
determining the stock prices of defense firms. In defense industry literature, there is a 
common belief that wars cause decrease in general confidence levels and therefore 
stock market is affected negatively, but wars may also positively affect the stock 
prices of defense-related companies. According to the report by McDonald and 
Kendall (1994), in 1987, Billingsley, Lamy and Thompson found that war-related 
events had significant positive effects on the stock prices of defense industry firms 
but negative effects on the stock market as a whole.
McDonald and Kendall (1994) examined the impacts of several political 
events, involving some kind of military actions on the stock prices of companies that 
supplied war-related materials. They used a sample of 16 firms that provided military 
equipment to the Department of Defense during the time period surrounding the 
events under investigation. By calculating cumulative abnormal returns, the authors
examined short-term effects of seventeen political events involving military force on 
the stock returns of their sample of U.S. defense firms. These events can be seen in 
table 3.1. They found that as a result of the military actions in which one of the 
super-powers, U.S. or Soviet Union, was a participant, the stock prices of defense- 
related firms tended to ri.se. For those events where neither super-power was a 
participant, the results were not significant. Then, they concluded that the effect was 
driven by the super-power participation.
Table 3.1 Seventeen Political Events Involving Military Force Examined in the 
Me Donald and Kendall (1994) Study
Cuban Missile Crisis Gulf of Tonkin Incident
Raids on Hanoi Six-Day War
Pueblo Incident Tel Offensive
Czechoslovakia Invasion Mayaguez Incident
Embassy Seizure Teheran Afghanistan Invasion
US Rescue Attempt in Iran South Atlantic War
Car Bomb US Embassy in Beirut Shoot Down of FLALOOV
Bombing of Marine Barracks in Beirut Grenada Liberation
Punitive Action in Libya
As it can be seen from the table 3.1, McDonald and Kendall (1994) have 
examined more general military events. Shapiro and Switzer (1999) restricted their 
analysis of major military events to actual wars. They took into account twenty-nine 
announcements related to five wars: the Vietnam War (1967-68), the Six Day War 
(1967), the Yom Kippur War (1973), the Falkland Island War (1982) and the Gulf 
War (1990-91). These announcements were not only war news but also peace 
announcements regarding to these conflicts. Their sample was from the list of the 
U.S. Department of Defense largest contractors and their sample size changed 
between 63 and 69 firms, depending on the event. Twenty-one of these 
announcements were related with the outbreak of war and eight of them were related
I.^
with the end of hostilities. They found thirteen positive defense portfolio returns for 
out of twenty-one war announcements and negative abnormal defense portfolio 
returns for six out of eight peace announcements. Therefore, the findings of previous 
studies that war-related events positively effect defense stocks were confirmed by 
Shapiro and Switzer. They also concluded that announcements of peace related 
events had a negative effect on defense stocks.
In the same study, Shapiro and Switzer (1999) extended their analysis to find 
whether some stocks in their portfolio were more responsive to war-related 
announcements than others. They examined three different properties of firms: a) the 
ratio of research and development expenditures to sales for each firm (RD), b) the 
ratio capital expenditures to sales for each firm (CE), c) the firm industry 
concentration ratio (CR). In the regression analysis, all these three variables assumed 
as independent variables in determining the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of 
each firm in the defense portfolio where CAR (-1, +1) is the CAR for the three days 
centred on the event day for each firm.
R&D ratio is chosen as a measure of technical complexity of the company 
and its capability in producing high-tech superior goods. They expect that firms with 
higher levels of R&D expenditures should have higher CARs. Then, coefficient on 
RD is hypothesized to be positive. According to Shapiro and Switzer, defense firms 
with high levels of capital spending could loose their bargaining advantages against 
the government. Then, the market would consider stocks of firms having above 
average levels of capital spending would have lower abnormal returns. Therefore, the 
coefficient on CE is hypothesized to be negative. The firm concentration ratio is a
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kind of measure showing the degree of market power held by firms in that industry. 
Because of the absence of enough competition, firms would have bargaining 
advantages in markets where a few firms have large market shares. So, the abnormal 
returns of those firms' stocks are expected to be higher leading to the hypothesis that 
coefficient on CR is positive.
After running the OLS regression model for the event of Gulf War, they 
found that RD and CR coefficients were positive and statistically significant at 5% 
and CE coefficient was negative at the 10%. This means that a defense firm’s 
technical complexity and its degree of market power are positively related while its 
bargaining power is negatively related with the cumulative abnormal return of the 
firm’s stock (Shapiro and Switzer, 1999).
Shapiro and Switzer’s study could be criticized because of the events that 
they investigated. From six war-related events, only two of them were directly 
related with the U.S. So, the impact of other four wars on the U.S. defense stocks 
may be indirect. For example, Falkland War was mainly related with British military 
while Yom Kippur and Six-Day wars were related with other militaries. Besides, 
their study did not examine the long-term impacts of these wars on the defense 
stocks and they used market model in their investigations.
This study tries to seek evidence for the conclusion of previous researches by 
examining the response of defense contractors’ stocks around the event of Gulf War. 
Previous researchers u.se market model and examine for a very short term CARs in 
their studies. This research, by applying three methods, investigates the short and
\5
long term effects of Gulf War on defense stocks. In addition, the impacts of two 
characteristics of the defense firms, the ratio of defense sales to total sales (defense 
dependency ratio -DDR) and the market value (MV), on their stock returns are 
examined. The next section presents the methodology and data used in this analysis.
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA
This chapter presents the hypotheses tested, the methodology, and data used 
in this thesis. First, the hypotheses are discussed. Second, the event day, event 
window and estimation period are described. Third, the construction of the sample is 
presented. Then, three methods, market model, market adjusted model and buy and 
hold model, used in calculating abnormal returns are explained.
Hypotheses
The first hypothesis tests the validity of the finding of previous studies, 
defense stocks react positively to the war-related events, for the Gulf War. Hence, 
the first null hypothesis states that defense-related stock prices do not react positively 
to U.S military intervention to Gulf Crises. In other words, the average cumulative 
abnormal return (ACARi) is hypothesized to be less than or equal to zero on and after 
the event day (ACAR, < 0 for all t > event day).
This study extends the analysis in order to find whether some defense related 
firms are more responsive to the event under question. Defense dependency and size 
are chosen as two factors that might affect the abnormal returns of the defense stocks 
after the event day.
CHAPTER IV
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It can be argued that the stocks of high defense dependent firms would be 
affected more relative to the stocks of low defense dependent firms from the Gulf 
War. Hence, the second null hypothesis states that returns of high defense dependent 
firms are not higher than the returns of low defense dependent firms.
There are several studies which examine size effect in stock markets. Dimson 
and Marsh (1986) state that size effect, “t/ic tendency for small capitalization stocks 
to outperform their larger counterparts ”, is the one of the most important regularity 
so far observed. They also restate the findings of others that, "an event study which 
focuses on a smaller (larger) firms is likely to witness positive (negative) abnormal 
returns relative to the market index.” So, the third null hypothesis states that the 
stocks of small sized defense firms do not have higher abnormal returns than those of 
large firms.
Lastly, the fourth null hypothesis states that defense dependency of a firm is 
not positively related with the abnormal returns of its stock, controlling for market 
value (size of the firm). Table 4.1 presents the summary of these hypotheses.
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Table 4.1 Summary of the Hypotheses 
Hypotheses____________________
H o i: Defense stocks do not react positively to the beginning of Gulf War.
H a l: Defense stocks react positively to the beginning of Gulf War.
Ho2; Returns of high defense dependent firms’ stocks are not higher than those 
of low defense dependent firms’ stocks.
Ha2;Returns of high defense dependent firms’ stocks are higher than those of 
low defense dependent firms’ stocks.
Ho3; Abnormal returns of small sized defense firms’ stocks are not higher than 
those of large defense firms’ stocks.
Ha3; Abnormal returns of small sized defense firms' stocks are higher than 
those of large defense firms’ stocks.
H q4 ; There is not a positive relation between defense dependency and 
abnormal returns of the firms, controlling for the size of the firm.
Ha4; There is a positive relation between defense dependency and abnormal 
returns of the firms, controlling for the size of the firm.________________________
Methodology
In this study, event study methodology is used in order to examine the impact 
of the Gulf War on the U.S. defense industry stocks. There is no unique structure for 
event studies. However, Mackinley (1997) specifies the following well-defined 
series of steps which are used in this study as well;
1. Identifying the event day, event window and estimation window.
2. Selection of the firms which will be included in the sample portfolio.
3. Defining the abnormal returns.
4. The design of the testing framework for the abnormal returns.
Identifying the event day, event window and estimation window
The U.S military preparations in the Gulf started right after the Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. At the beginning, the aim of the U.S. military
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deployment was to deter the Iraqi government to enlarge their invasion to Saudi 
Arabia and the other Gulf countries. When Iraqi government did not take any back 
steps, the U.S. military accelerated their preparations starting on October 31, 1990 to 
force the Iraqi military to withdraw from Kuwait. On November 29, 1990, the United 
Nation (U.N.) Security Council authorized the use of “all means necessary” to eject 
Iraq from Kuwait. During this time period political efforts were continuing to 
convince the Iraqies to leave Kuwait territory. At the begining of January 1991, there 
was uncertainty about how this conflict would be solved. The U.S. military was 
ready for the attack in the middle of the January and the deadline to leave Kuwait, 
15 January, set by the U.N. was about to come. The U.S. Congress authorized the use 
of force on January 12, 1991. The ambiguity existed until 17 January, the first day of 
the Allied military intervention. Therefore, the begining date of the Gulf War, 17 
January, is considered as the event day in this study.The chronology of events related 
to the Gulf War is presented in the appendix.
The event window is the period in which the security prices of the firms are 
involved in the event. The event window is defined as 253 days which include the 
event day (intervention day) and 252 days (one year) after the intervention.
The estimation window is the period in which required parameters are 
estimated to calculate the expected returns in event window. Generally, the 
estimation window is the period prior to the event window. The event period is not 
included in the estimation period to eliminate any impact on parameter estimates. 
However, there is no consensus about the length of estimation period. For example. 
Brown and Warner (1985) used first 239 days of their 250-day event period as
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estimation window. Dyckman et al. (1984) used the days between -120 and -60 days 
before the event and days between +60 and +120 after the event to calculate the 
parameter estimates. Mackinley (1997) employed a 41 -day event window, comprised 
of 20 pre-event days, the event day, and 20 post-event days. He used 250 trading day 
period prior to the event window as the estimation window. In this study, the 
estimation window is taken as a year (250 days) which ends 20 days before the event 
day.
Selection of the finns which will be included in sample portfolio
The firms used in this study were chosen from defense-related industries. The 
list of the Department of Defense (DoD) top 100 contractors receiving the largest 
dollar volume of prime contract awards for the year 1990 was used in determining 
the sample. The companies in this list vary greatly in terms of their dollar amounts of 
DoD prime contracts they received and their total sales.
Among top 100 firms, only firms that were publicly traded in the U.S. stock 
markets are examined in this study. The data about only fifty-nine firms out of 100 
firms are obtained. Then, the firms that had defense dependency ratio above 5% are 
included in the sample, reducing the sample size to thirty-nine firms. It is assumed 
that 5% defense dependency is a critical level in identifying the defense dependent 
firms.
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The abnormal return is the difference between the actual return and the 
expected return of the security over the event window. In this study, the abnormal 
returns are calculated using three methods. First, market model is employed. Then, 
market adjusted model is used. Lastly, holding period returns are calculated. 
Abnormal returns can be also calculated using mean adjusted return model. 
However, according to McDonald and Kendall (1994) mean adjusted return model 
tended to give positively biased results in the presence of cross-sectional clustering. 
As all of the firms in the sample are within similar industries, cross-sectional 
clustering is expected. Therefore, this method is not used in the study.
Daily returns are found by using log form as follows:
Ri, = log (price, /price,.])
Market Model
This model assumes that there is a stable linear relationship between the 
market return and the security return. It is a statistical model which relates the return 
of any given security to the return of the market portfolio. This method considers the 
risk of the stock and the movement of the market during the event period. Henderson 
(1990) states that it is simplest to use and it gives similar results like the more 
complicated approaches. The expected return (E(Rj,)) and abnormal return (ARi,)on 
stock i on day t are defined as follows:
E(Ri,)=(Oi -hPiRm.)
ARi, = Ri, -  (Oi + PiRin.)
Defining the abnormal returns
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where Rjt is the daily rate of return on security / for day t, and R,n, is the market 
return (S&P 100 index) for the day t. The coefficients ttj and Pi are ordinary least 
square estimates of the intercept and slope which are calculated using an estimation 
period for all the securities in the sample. It is assumed that during the estimation and 
the analysis periods, beta coefficients of the related stocks did not change. R~ of 
the.se regressions are presented in table 3 in the appendix.
Abnormal returns are calculated for each security and for each day in the 
event period time frame. Then, by adding these daily abnormal returns, cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) for each stock in the sample are computed using the time 
frame from first day of the military intervention to 252 trading days after the 
intervention. Therefore, CARj, could be defined as
I
CAR„= X aR,,
k=0
The average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) on a day t for n securities is 
defined as
n
ACARf  Y^CARJn
/=)
where CARj is the cumulative abnormal return for the ith security until day t starting 
from the event day, and n is the number of firms in the sample portfolio.
Although Brown and Warner (1980,1985) found that more elaborate 
modelling and test statistics were not .superior to the market model in detecting 
abnormal performance, there are some shortcomings of the market model. First, in 
the estimation of betas, the strength of the market model is very much related to the 
quality of OLS regression. The efficiency of the market model is highly related to the
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R“ of the market regression. "The higher the R^ , the greater is the variance reduction 
of the abnormal return, and the larger is the gain" (Mackinley, 1997). In the event 
study literature the researchers rarely reported the R" of their regressions. This leads 
us to think that the quality of R^  s was ignored in most of the event studies using 
market model. Low R‘ values obtained for 39 firms in the sample (table 3 in the 
appendix) show that the regression models are not so powerful in estimating the 
expected returns.
Second, since the firms in the sample are from related sectors and the event 
day is the same for all these firms’ .stocks, using market model could give biased 
results because of the event clustering. Third, this major event could have changed 
the parameters of the market model for each stock. Then, using the coefficients 
estimated for the pre-event period may not be appropriate. Because of the above 
limitations of the market model, market adjusted model and buy and hold method are 
also used in order to calculate abnormal returns.
Market Adjusted Return Model
According to this method, the expected firm return on stock is equal to the 
market return for that period. To find the abnormal return (ARj,), market return (Rjn,) 
is subtracted from actual return (Ru) of individual firm.
E(Rii)= Rmt
A R it =  R i t " Rmi
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Buy and Hold Method (An Alternative Model)
Conrad and Caul (1993) argued that by cumulating short-term returns over 
long periods, strategies that used CARs cumulated not only the “true” short-term 
returns but also upward bias in each of the single-period returns. In order to eliminate 
this bias, they suggested that abnormal returns used in the event studies should be 
substituted by holding period returns. Especially, to measure the long-term 
performance, buy and hold method could be an alternative method, because this 
measure has the additional advantages of minimizing transaction cost and reducing 
the statistical biases in cumulative performance measures. Therefore, as a third 
methodology in this study, the holding period returns of portfolios are also calculated 
and the results are compared with those of previous models.
For one-year holding period returns of the sample portfolios, first, the holding 
period return of each security in the portfolio is calculated. In order to calculate the 
buy and hold abnormal performance (BHARjt) with respect to the market index, 
holding period returns of market portfolio (BHR„„) are subtracted from the holding 
period returns of the sample firms (BHRj,). Then, the average buy and hold abnormal 
returns (ABHAR) are computed for each sample portfolio as follows:
BHARi,= BHRi, - BHR,m
n
ABHARf  Y^BHARJii
/=1
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In event studies, after calculating the abnormal returns for each stock and 
aggregating them, the cumulative abnormal returns should be tested in order to 
determine whether there is any change on the returns because of the event. In this 
study, the four null hypotheses are tested using three statistical methods. T-test, two- 
sample means test and one-way ANOVA are used to te.st the first three hypotheses. A 
regression model is estimated for the last hypothesis.
The design o f the testing framework for the abnormal returns
Data
Adjusted daily stock prices, net sales and market values of thirty-nine firms 
over the period analyzed are obtained from databases maintained by Datastream Inc. 
Data related to military sales are obtained from the DoD top 100 contractor list for 
1990.
The firms in the sample were classified in three categories according to their 
defense dependency ratios (the ratio of military sales to total sales-DDR). This ratio 
is used in order to determine the defense intensity of each firm. Similar procedure is 
used by Mayer and Roshwalb (1986) in order to identify defense dependency of 
firms. Thirteen firms were included in each category. The first portfolio includes 
heavily defense dependent firms that have at least 30 % of their sales to DoD. The 
second group consists of firms that have defen.se dependency ratio between \A%- 
30%. The remaining 13 less dependent firms, having defense dependency ratio
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between 5%-14%, are included in the group. The mean DDRs of these three 
defense portfolios are 49%, 17%, and 8% respectively. Table 1 in the appendix 
shows the list of these firms with their military sales and defense dependency ratios.
In addition to this major classification based on defense dependency ratios, 
the firms in the sample divided into two groups according to their market values as 
large and small firms in order to examine the size effect. The “large” portfolio 
consists of the first 20 firms with the highest market value. The rest is included in the 
“small” portfolio. The mean market values of these small and large portfolios are 
S345 million and $3106 million dollars respectively. Table 2 in the appendix presents 
the classification of the sample firms with respect to their market values and defense 
dependency ratios.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS
Market Model Results
In this section, the short-term and the long-term impacts of the Gulf War on 
the stock prices of firms in the U.S. defense industry are examined by using ACARs 
of stocks where abnormal returns are calculated using market model.
First, average abnormal returns (AARs) of sample portfolios are calculated. 
Then, ACARs of sample portfolios are examined for different time horizons ranging 
from one day to one year. The AAR values of all stocks and three DDR portfolios in 
20 days surrounding the event day are shown in table 5.1. In preparing this table 
stocks in the sample are placed into three portfolios according to their defense 
dependency ratios (DDRs). Portfolio 1 includes the firms with the highest DDR as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, i.e., the ratio of defense sales to their total sales is 
more than 30%. Portfolio 2 includes the firms with moderate DDRs (14% and 30%). 
Similarly, portfolio 3 consists of the firms with the lowest DDRs (5% and 14%). As 
it is seen from the Table 5.1, the size of the three portfolios are the same. All include 
13 defense firms. AARs and test statistics of all stocks and three portfolios are 
presented in Table 5.1 as well.
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No significant AAR is observed on the event day and the day after the start of
Gulf War for all stocks and for the three portfolios (table 5.1). However, the portfolio
including all stocks has significant AARs on the days 2,1, 12 and 13. Portfolio 1,
the highest defense dependent firms, has significant AARs, on the days 2, 3 and 13.
Table 5.1 -  AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (AARs) OF DEFENSE 
STOCKS FOR 20 DAYS AFTER THE GULF WAR (market model)
Days Alt stocks Portfolio 1 portfolio 2 portfolio 3
Size 39 13 13 13
DDR >5% >30% 14%-30°/ 5%-14%
Time AARs t value AARs t value AARs t value AARs t value
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
0.000
0.002
0 .012* * *
0.003
0.001
- 0.002
0.002
0.004**
0.003
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.008**
0.004**
0.002
0.000
0.004
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.003
0.07 0.002 0.50 -0.001 -0.14 -0.002 -0.60
0.78 0.005 1.06 0.001 0.26 0.000 0.11
3.85 0.032*** 6.53 0.005 1.18 0.000 0.06
1.44 0.010** 2.23 0.001 0.22 0.000 -0.17
0.45 0.000 0.10 0.000 -0.17 0.001 0.38
-1.13 -0.005 -1.57 0.000 -0.02 0.001 0.35
0.92 0.003 1.10 0.000 0.24 0.001 0.28
2.03 0.003 0.68 0.004** 2.39 0.004 1.41
1.57 0.008** 2.71 -0.001 -0.24 -0.001 -0.90
0.39 0.004 1.15 -0.006 -0.83 0.004 1.16
0.18 -0.006** -3.22 0.007 1.13 0.001 0.61
0.51 0.001 0.43 0.001 0.45 0.000 0.18
2.43 0.011 1.50 0.007 1.07 0.004* 1.87
2.34 0.011** 2.56 0.002 0.84 0.000 -0.04
1.09 0.007 1.26 -0.001 -0.51 0.001 0.30
-0.21 -0.004 -1.26 -0.002 -0.63 0.006* 2.11
0.95 0.001 0.20 0.010 0.94 -0.002 -0.58
0.21 0.002 0.37 0.004 0.93 -0.003 -0.99
0.01 0.004 0.88 0.000 -0.10 -0.001 -0.53
-0.18 0.003 0.51 -0.002 -0.61 -0.005 -1.75
-1.97 -0.002 -0.97 -0.004 -1.57 -0.002 -0.69
·. " ,  and *'* indicate a ieveis at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively
Table 5.2 presents the calculated ACARs for the specific time periods. The 
ACARs of all stocks are all significant for the time periods after the day 1. Since t 
values of ACARs are statistically significant, the null hypothesis stating defense 
stocks do not react positively to the beginning of Gulf War is rejected both in the 
short term and in the long term. Supporting the previous studies, defense stocks are 
found to be reacting positively to the start of Gulf War.
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Table 5.2
All
stocks
Portfolio 1 portfolio 2 portfolio 3
Size(n) 39 13 13 13
DDR >5% >30% 14%-30% 5%-14%
Time period ACAR t value ACAR t value ACAR t value ACAR t value
Day 0 0.000 -0.02 0.002 0.50 -0.001 -0.14 -0.002 -0.60
Day 1 0.002 0.59 0.007 0.97 0.001 0.11 -0.002 -0.30
Day 2 0.014** 2.79 0.039** 3.57 0.006 0.87 -0.001 -0.37
Day 3 0.018** 2.88 0.049** 3.67 0.006 0.91 -0.002 -0.45
Day 4 0.018** 2.94 0.050*** 4.03 0.006 0.78 -0.001 -0.15
One week 0.017** 2.79 0.044*** 3.88 0.006 0.71 0.000 -0.01
2 weeks 0.026** 3.55 0.058*** 4.47 0.010 1.00 0.009 0.91
One month 0.044** 3.60 0.088** 3.14 0.032** 2.18 0.012 0.96
2 months 0.055** 2.86 0.118** 2.81 0.037 1.19 0.009 0.64
6 months 0.085** 3.10 0.182** 3.11 0.033 0.82 0.039 1.34
9 months 0.091** 2.83 0.184** 2.84 0.058 1.00 0.032 0.91
One year 0.146** 3.72 0.251*· 3.26 0.110* 1.52 0.078* 1.71
, and *** indicate a levels at, 0.1, 0.01 and 0.001 respectively
The ACAR of portfolio 1 is found to be 3.9% with a significant t value on 
day 2. The ACARs of this portfolio are increasing over time. For example, ACARs 
of portfolio 1 are 8.8%, 18.2% and 25.1% for one month, six-month and one year 
after the event, all of them are significant at 1 percent. Since there is no significant 
positive abnormal return on the event day and one day after the event day, the market 
can be considered to be reacting a little bit late to the event. However, starting from 
the second day, they predict the future growth opportunities in the defense-related 
stocks.
The ACARs of portfolio 2 are significant one month and one year after event 
day which is 3.2% and 11% respectively. Portfolio 3 has negative returns after the 
event until day 4, but they are not significant. The only significant ACAR is 
observed one year after event day which is 7.8% for the portfolio 3. The results 
suc^sest that market did not react positively for stocks with lower defense 
dependency. These differences among the portfolio returns imply that the impact of 
the Gulf War is immediate and more on the highest defense dependent stocks.
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Figure 5.1 presents long term (one calendar year-252 trading days) ACARs of 
the three DDR portfolios. As it can be seen from this figure, the highest defense 
dependent portfolio (portfolio 1) has the highest returns comparing to other 
portfolios. So, supporting the ACARs in the table, it seems that the impact of the 
Gulf War is more on the highest defense dependent stocks both in the short-term and 
in the long term than on the lower defense dependent stocks.
In order to test whether the ACAR values of the three portfolios are different 
in the short-run (one week) and long-run (one year), one-way analysis of variance 
lANOVA) is employed. The null hypothesis that ACARs of all portfolios are equal is 
tested against the alternative hypothesis that the ACARs of portfolios differ for at 
least two of the portfolios.
Ho · ACAR portfolio 1 ~ ACAR ponfoiio2 ~ ACAR ponfoiio.s 
Ha: The ACARs differ for at least two of the portfolios
The Table 5.3 panel A shows the results for this hypothesis testing both in 
short-term and long-term ACARs for different portfolios. According to these results, 
the null hypothesis is rejected in the short term. However, this hypothesis may not be 
rejected in the long run, because the long-term returns on portfolio 2 and portfolio 3 
are very similar to each other compared to returns on portfolio 1 (10.98%, 7.75% 
versus 25.06%). Therefore, whether there is any difference between the highest 
defense dependent firms (portfolio 1) and the lowest defense dependent firms 
(portfolio 3) ACAR values is tested for short-term and long-term. The null 
hj'pothesis that portfolio 1 ACAR and portfolio 3 ACAR are equal is tested against 
the alternative hypothesis that portfolio 1 ACAR is greater than portfolio 3 ACAR.
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FIGURE 5.1 ACARs OF DEFENSE PORTFOLIOS AND MARKET INDEX (market model)
Panel A. Results of One-way Analysis of Variance
Table 5.3 ACARs Comparison Among the Defense Portfolios (market model)
Short term (one week) Long-term (one year)
Groups Count Average Variance Average Variance
portfolio 1 13 0.0441 0.0017 0.2506 0.0769
portfolio 2 13 0.0058 0.0009 0.1098 0.0683
portfolio 3 13 -0.0001 0.0006 0.0775 0.0267
ANOVA ANOVA
F 7.147 F 1.920
P-value 0.002 P-value 0.161
F crit 3.259 F crit 3.259
Panel B. Comparing ACAR of the Highest and the Lowest Defense 
Dependent Firms________________________________________
Short term (one week) 
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 3
Mean 0.044 0.000 0.251
Vanance 0.002 0.001 0.077
tStat 3.466’ ** 2.982^
** indicates a at 0.01 level
Long-term (one year) 
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 3 
0.078 
0.027
Ho ■ ACAR portfolio I ■ ACAR portfolio — 0 
Ha; ACAR portfolio i * ACAR portfolio .t > 0
Table 5.3 panel B presents the results of this hypothesis testing. The null 
hypothesis is rejected in the short term and long term. Therefore, it might be 
concluded that sufficient evidence exist to infer that the ACARs of the highest 
defense dependent firms (portfolio 1) are more than ACAR of the lowest defense 
dependent firms (portfolio 3) in the short-run and in the long-run.
These results confirm the finding of previous studies that military 
intervention positively affects defense stocks in the short-run. Moreover, its positive 
effect is observed in the long run. Market believes that military intervention will 
increase the defense spending and increase in defense spending affects the future
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sales of the defense companies, resulting increased future earnings for these firms. 
Then, investors anticipate this increase and they reflect their expectations on these 
stocks’ prices. This is consistent with the market efficiency concept. Moreover, the 
findings indicate that the stocks of firms with the highest defense dependency ratios 
provides the highest ACARs, suggesting that these firms affected most from this war.
Size effect
The firms in the sample are divided into two groups, large and small and their 
ACARs are calculated separately. Table 5.4 summarizes the average abnormal 
returns of the small firms calculated using market model. As observed for all stocks, 
small stocks have significant average cumulative abnormal return for all periods after 
day 2. When small stocks in different defense dependency categories are examined, 
these results seem to be mainly driven by the highest defense dependent stocks. 
Portfolio 1 (small and DDR >30%) has significant returns beginning from the day 2 
(day 2 ACAR is 4.3%). The abnormal returns of portfolio 1 are increasing over time. 
After one month, six months and one year from the event day, ACAR values for 
portfolio 1 are 11.4%, 23.7% and 32.9% re.spectively and all are significant. Portfolio 
2 and portfolio 3 have lower ACARs than ACARs of portfolio 1. Both portfolios’ 
ACARs are even negative on the event day, day 1 and day 2. For portfolio 3, these 
ACARs are statistically significant. However, one month after the event, the ACAR 
of portfolio 2 increases to 5.8% with a significant t value and portfolio 3 has 
sisnificant ACARs such as, 2.4%, 3.7%, 8% and 12.3%, for the periods two weeks, 
one month, six month and one year after the event day.
.^4
Table 5.4 ACARs OF SM ALL FIRM PORTFOLIOS (market model)
All small 
stocks
portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3
Slze(n) 19 8
DDR >0% >30% 14%-30% 5%-14%
Time ACAR t value ACAR t value ACAR t value ACAR t value
Day 0 
Day 1 
Day 2 
Day 3 
Day 4 
one week 
2 weeks 
one month 
2 months 
6 months 
9 months 
one year
0.001
0.001
0.016*
0.025*
0.028**
0.025*
0.039**
0.076***
0.106**
0.147**
0.157**
0.241***
0.27
0.10
1.74
2.36
2.63
2.44
3.31
3.90
3.09
3.27
2.97
3.80
0.007
0.010
0.043*
0.056*
0.059**
0.053*
0.071**
0 . 114 *
0.168*
0.237*
0.240*
0.329*
1.09
0.84
2.72 
2.86 
3.51 
3.21 
4.05 
2.90 
2.74 
2.86
2.73 
3.13
-0.0003
-0.003
- 0.002
0.005
0.005
0.004
0.009
0.058*
0.080
0.082
0.132
0.223
-0.05
-0.25
-0.15
0.40
0.34
0.24
0.44
2.28
1.23
1.05
1.18
1.62
-0.007*
- 0. 010*
-0.006
0.001
0.004
0.005
0.024*
0.037*
0.037*
0.080**
0.055
0.123**
-2.41
-2.14
-1.27
0.19
0.64
0.87
2.18
3.09
2.26
3.47
1.39
2.19
*, **, and *** indicate a levels at 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 respectively
Table 5.5 reports the ACARs of large firm portfolios. The ACARs of large 
firm portfolios are found to be low comparing to small firm portfolios. The ACARs 
of large stocks are significant for the periods between day 2 and two weeks. They are 
also significant one year after the event. Although large and highly defense 
dependent firms (portfolio 1) have significant ACARs on day 2, day 3, day 4, one 
week, two-week and two months, their ACAR values are not found to be significant 
for the other time periods. Portfolio 2 has only significant ACAR on day 2 and two 
weeks after the event day while portfolio 3 do not have any significant returns. These 
results mean that the impact of Gulf War for the large defense dependent firms is 
significant in short term. Although long-term ACAR is significant for all large 
stocks, it is smaller, 5.6%, compared to the ACAR for small stocks, 24.1 %.
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Table 5.5 ACARs OF LARGE FIRM PORTFOLIOS (market model)
All
stocks
portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3
Size(n) 20 8
DDR >5% >30% 14%-30% 5%-14°/
Time period ACAR t value ACAR t value ACAR t value ACAR t value
Day 0 
Day 1 
Day 2 
Day 3 
Day 4 
one week 
2 weeks 
one month 
2 months 
6 months 
9 months 
one year
- 0.001
0.004
0.013
0.011
0.009
0.009
0.013
0.013
0.006
0.026
0.029
0.056
-0.39 
0.86 
2 40-
1.67*
1.44’
1.42*
1.66 *
1.14
0.58
0.96
0.86
1.44*
-0.005
0.003
0.033**
0.039**
0.034**
0.030**
0.037**
0.045
0.037*
0.092
0.095
0.125
-1.24
0.46
2.19
2.26
2.05
2.35
2.27
1.42 
1.73
1.43 
1.07 
1.32
- 0.001
0.003
0 . 012*
0.007
0.006
0.007
0 .010 * *
0.009
0.001
-0.008
-0.006
0.013
-0.15
0.48
1.82
0.94
0.96
1.22
2.32
0.78
0.05
-0.24
-0.14
0.26
0.001
0.004
0.001
-0.003
-0.004
-0.003
0.000
-0.003
-0.008
0.014
0.018
0.049
0.32
0.49
0.26
-0.57
-0.44
-0.32
- 0.01
- 0.20
-0.39
0.31
0.33
0.75
*, and ” , indicate a levels at 0.10, and 0.05 respectively
The difference between the ACARs of large and small firms is apparent in 
figure 5.2 as well. This figure also indicates that the returns of small defense firms 
are higher than the returns of large defense firms.
In order to test the difference between large and small firms’ ACAR values 
for short-term (one week) and long-term (one-year) time periods, t test is employed. 
The third null hypothesis stating that ACARs of small defense firms’ stocks are not 
higher than those of large defense firms’ stocks is te.sted.
Ho ; ACARS(small firms) " ACARS(|arge firms) — 0 
Ha · ACARS(sniall firms) " ACARS(i arge firms) > 0
.16
FIGURE 5.2 ACARs OF SMALL AND LARGE DEFENSE PORTFOLIOS (market model)
-small
large
days
Table 5.6 presents sufficient evidence to infer that small defense firms 
provide more returns comparing those of large defense firms in both short-term and 
long-term time periods with market model.
Table 5.6 Comparing ACARs of Small and Large Market Value Firms
Short-term (one week)
All stocks Small firms Large firms 
Mean 
Variance 
tStat
Long-term (one year) 
Small firms Large firms
0.009
0.001
0.025 
0.002 
1.374*
indicate a at 0.1 and 0.01 levels.
0.241 
0.077 
3.41 r*
0.051
0.031
Market Adjusted Model Results
In this section, ACARs of the U.S. defense industry stocks are examined 
where abnormal returns are calculated using market adjusted model. Defense 
dependency and size effect hypotheses are also tested using ACARs calculated with 
this model.
Table 5.7 reports the ACARs of the portfolios and t statistics for selected time 
periods where ACARs are calculated with market adjusted model. The ACARs of 
three porfolios and those of all stocks are not as high as the ACARs calculated using 
the market model. The reason for this might be the increase in market index right 
after the event. The market, as a whole, reacted positively to start of the Gulf War. 
Since the market index is used to calculate the abnormal returns of defense stocks, 
ACARs of the market adjusted model appear to be lower than those of the market 
model.
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The ACARs of all stocks are found to be negative and significant on day 0 
and day 1, then they have positive and significant ACARs on day 3 and day 4. This 
could be interpreted as the market index return is higher than the returns of the all 
defense stocks for the day 0 and day 1 then prices readjusts providing positive 
ACARs on day 3 and day 4. The increasing trend in cumulative abnormal returns is 
not observed as it has been in the market model. Hotvever, the ACAR of all stocks, 
one year after the event, 4.8%, is found to be .statistically significant.
Table 5.7 ACARs OF SAMPLE PORTFOLIOS (market adjusted model)
All stocks Portfolio 1 portfolio 2 portfolio 3
Size(n) 39 13 13 13
DDR >5% >30% 14%-30% 5%-14%
Time ACAR t value ACAR t value ACAR t value ACAR t value
Day 0 -0.007*** -2.87 -0.007* -1.61 -0.008** -2.34 -0.006 -1.16
Day 1 -0.006** -1.84 -0.005 -0.66 -0.008* -1.45 -0.005* -1.38
Day 2 0.007* 1.51 0.028*** 2.62 -0.001 -0.24 -0.005* -1.46
Days 0.012** 1.94 0.040*** 3.03 0.000 -0.05 -0.005 -1.03
Day 4 0.010* 1.74 0.039*** 3.20 -0.002 -0.32 -0.005 -0.91
One Vi/eek 0.007 1.19 0.030*** 2.71 -0.004 -0.51 -0.005 -0.52
2 weeks 0.011* 1.50 0.036*** 2.80 -0.005 -0.42 0.001 0.13
One month 0.016* 1.57 0.047** 1.79 0.005 0.45 -0.004 -0.44
2 months 0.021 1.23 0.070** 1.90 0.002 0.08 -0.010 -0.83
6 months 0.023 1.06 0.105** 2.50 -0.034 -0.98 -0.003 -0.12
9 months 0.009 0.46 0.087** 2.27 -0.037 -1.12 -0.021 -0.82
One year 0.048** 2.14 0.124** 2.58 -0.003 -0.10 0.024 0.93
*, **, and *** indicate a levels at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively
Portfolio 1 has significant ACARs starting on day 2 (2.8%) and ACARs 
increase to 10.5% and 12.4% in six months and one year time period. All the returns 
after day 1 are significant. Portfolio 2 and portfolio 3’s ACARs are not high and they 
are mostly negative. Especially, portfolio 2 has negative and significant return on the 
event day. Figure 5.3 presents the ACARs of sample portfolios for one year time 
period. Since portfolio 1 has higher returns than the market index over the period 
analyzed, its ACARs are higher than ACARs of portfolio 2 and portfolio 3.
.■^9
FIGURE 5.3 ACARs OF DEFENSE PORTFOLIOS (market adjusted model)
Table 5.8 reports the test results of the hypothesis of the equality of ACARs 
of three defense dependent firms, where ACARs are calculated usina market 
adjusted model.
Ho . ACAR portfolio 1 ~ ACAR portfolio 2 ~ ACAR portfolio 3 
Ha: The ACARs differ for at least two of the portfolios
Table 5.8 ACARs Comparison Among the Defense Portfolios (market adjusted 
model)
Panel A. Results of One-way Analysis of Variance
Short term (one week) Long-term (one year)
Groups Count Average Variance Average Variance
portfolio 1 13 0.0303 0.0016 0.1240 0.0300
portfolio 2 13 -0.0043 0.0009 -0.0033 0.0142
portfolio 3 13 -0.0047 0.0010 0.0241 0.0087
ANOVA ANOVA
F 4.441 F 3.311
P-vakje 0.019 P-value 0.048
Fcrit 3.259 F crit 3.259
Panel B. Comparing ACAR of the Highest and the Lowest Defense
Dependent Firms
Short term (one week) Long-term (one year)
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 1 Portfolio 3
Mean 0.030 -0.005 0.124 0.024
Variance 0.002 0.001 0.030 0.009
tStat 2.421’ * 2.406**
 ^ Indicates significancy a at 0.05 level
According to the results of one-way anova, the alternative hypothesis which 
states that the average cumulative abnormal returns differ for at least two of the 
portfolios is accepted for both short and long term. Then, in order to test if there is 
any difference between the highest defense dependent (portfolio 1) and the lowest 
defense dependent firms (portfolio 3), ACAR values are compared using t test for
41
short-term (one week) and long term (one year). The null hypothesis stating that 
portfolio 1 ACARs are not higher than portfolio 3 ACARs is tested against the 
alternative hypothesis that portfolio 1 ACARs is greater than portfolio 3 ACARs.
Ho . ACAR portfolio I ■ ACAR portfolio .t — 0
Ha . ACAR portfolio I “ ACAR portfolio .1 ^ 0
Table 5.8 panel B presents the re.sults of hypothesis testing. The null 
hypothesis is rejected in the short term and long term. Therefore, it might be 
concluded that sufficient evidence exist to infer that the ACARs of the highest 
defense dependent firms are more than ACAR of the lowest defense dependent firms 
both in the short term and in long term.
The size effect is also examined for the market adjusted model. Table 5.9 
reports the ACARs and t statistics for selected time periods of the small size 
portfolios. The portfolio of all small stocks has significant and negative returns on 
day 0 and day 1. This might be observed because market increased more than the 
increase in prices of these stocks after the Gulf War. Then, ACARs of all small 
stocks portfolio readju.sted with significant and positive values, such as 1.8%, 3.9%, 
5.7% and 7.1% for periods day 4, one month, two months and one year.
The significant and positive ACARs are observed for highest defense 
dependent and small stocks (portfolio 1) starting from day 2. They are 4.9%, 14.6% 
and 17.1% for two-week, six month and one year time periods with significant t 
values. These ACARs are low comparing to market model results, but the impact of 
event on portfolio 1 is positive and lasts longer comparing to other two portfolios
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like it was observed when ACARs are calculated with market model. Portfolio 2 and 
portfolio 3 ACARs are mostly negative. This negative impact of the war is 
significant on day 1 for portfolio 2 and on event day, day 1, and day 2 for portfolio 3. 
Table 5.9 ACARs OF SMALL FIRM PORTFOLIOS (market adjusted model)
All
stocks
Portfolio 1 portfolio 2 Portfolio 3
Size(n) 19 8
DDR >5% >30% 14%-30% 5%-14%
Time ACAR t value ACAR t value ACAR t value ACAR t value
Day 0 -0.006* -2.04 -0.002 -0.35 -0.007 -1.22 -0.013*** -6.67
Day 1 -0.009* -1.70 -0.002 -0.21 -0.011* -1.68 -0.017*** -4.11
Day 2 0.007 0.78 0.032** 2.05 -0.010 -1.10 -0.013** -2.15
Day 3 0.017* 1.66 0.047** 2.39 -0.003 -0.26 -0.005* -0.92
Day 4 0.018** 1.79 0.049** 2.86 -0.004 -0.30 -0.003* -0.52
One Nveek 0.013 1.31 0.039** 2.37 -0.008 -0.50 -0.004 -0.58
2 weeks 0.020* 1.57 0.049** 2.70 -0.010 -0.41 0.009* 0.76
One month 0.039** 2.13 0.072** 1.92 0.020 0.89 0.009** 0.55
2 months 0.057* 1.78 0.116** 2.17 0.026 0.39 0.001* 0.05
6 months 0.052* 1.35 0.146** 2.49 -0.039 -0.51 0.012 0.32
9 months 0.028 0.82 0.119** 2.54 -0.039 -0.63 -0.038 -0.93
One year 0.071* 1.71 0.171** 2.65 -0.003 -0.04 0.001* 0.01
*, and *** indicate a levels at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively
Table 5.10 ACARs OF LARGE FIRM PORTFOLIOS (market adjusted model)
All
stocks
Portfolio 1 portfolio 2 Portfolio 3
Size(n) 20 5 7 8
DDR >5% >30% 14%-30% 5%-14%
Time ACAR t value ACAR t value ACAR t value ACAR t value
Day 0 -0.006** -1.93 -0.015** -3.16 -0.005 -0.99 0.000 -0.04
Day 1 -0.002 -0.61 -0.009 -1.15 -0.002 -0.33 0.002 0.24
Day 2 0.008* 1.62 0.023* 1.51 0.007 1.11 -0.001 -0.14
Day 3 0.007 1.11 0.030* 1.81 0.003 0.42 -0.005 -1.06
Day 4 0.004 0.73 0.024* 1.49 0.002 0.24 -0.006 -0.84
One week 0.002 0.39 0.017 1.39 0.001 0.16 -0.006 -0.69
2 weeks 0.002 0.38 0.016 1.07 0.000 0.07 -0.005 -0.39
One month -0.006 -0.65 0.008 0.26 -0.008 -0.98 -0.012 -1.02
2 months -0.015** -2.23 -0.004 -0.27 -0.019** -2.33 -0.019* -1.52
6 months -0.005 -0.26 0.040 0.80 -0.033 -1.16 -0.009 -0.34
9 months -0.008 -0.35 0.036 0.55 -0.033 -1.02 -0.014 -0.41
One year 0.007 0.30 0.049 0.77 -0.023 -0.61 0.008 0.22
*·, and *** indicate a ieveis at 0.10 and 0.05 respectively
In the examination of large firm portfolios with the market adjusted model, 
the negative and significant ACARs are observed for all large stocks and for highly 
defense dependent large stocks (portfolio 1) on day 0. Then, on day 2 ACAR of all
4.3
stocks portfolio increases to 0.8%. The ACARs of portfolio 1 increa.se to 2.3% and 
3% on day 2 and day 3 with significant t values (Table 5.10). Portfolio 2 and 
portfolio 3 have mostly negative ACARs, but they are not all significant. Two 
months after the event, ACARs of all large stocks and those of the moderately and 
lowest defense dependent large stocks (portfolio 2 and portfolio 3) are found to be 
negative and significant. Since this date approximately corresponds the end of the 
Gulf War, this negative return might be explained as the effect of the end of War.
Figure 5.4 presents the ACARs calculated using market adjusted method for 
the large and small stocks over one year period. This figure also indicates that small 
defense firms have higher abnormal returns than the large defense firms.
Table 5.11 reports the results of the test of the null hypothesis stating that the 
small defense firms do not have higher returns than the large defense firms. It is 
found that the small sized defense firms stock returns are significantly greater than 
those of large defense firms in the long-term. The short-term result is not consistent 
with the result of the market model, because there is a significant increase in the 
market index in the short term which does not allow any significant increase on 
abnormal returns of the small defense firms.
Ho ; ACARS(small firms) ‘ ACARS(iarge firms) — 0 
Ha : ACARS(small firms) ' ACARS(|arge firms) > 0
Table 5.11 Comparing ACAR of Small and Large Market Value Firms
Short-term (one week) Long-term (one year)
Portfolio 123 Small firms Large firms Small firms Large firms
Mean 0.013 0.002 0.071 0.007
Variance 0.002 0.001 0.033 0.012
t Stat 0.970 1.337*
* indicate a  is significant at 0.1 level
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FIGURE 5.4 ACARs OF SMALL AND LARGE DEFENSE PORTFOLIOS (market adjusted model)
-sm all
large
The impact of Gulf War on the U.S. defense stocks is also examined by using 
average buy and hold abnormal returns (ABHAR) of the sample portfolios. Table 
5.12 presents ABHARs for selected time periods. The ABHAR of all stocks is only 
significant one week after the event day which is 1.1%. Hence, the first null 
hypothesis is rejected only in the short-term.
Among three portfolios only portfolio 1 has significant ABHARs for all of 
the selected time periods, such as; 3.9%, 5.5%, 7.6% and 11.8% for one week, one 
month, six month and one year holding period times respectively. There is an 
increasing trend for the stocks in this portfolio. In general, portfolio 2 and portfolio 3 
have negative ABHARs, but they are not significant. We may infer that the start of 
the Gulf War affects the portfolio 1, including high defense dependent firms, more 
than other portfolios including less defense dependent firms.
Table 5.12 ABHARs OF SAMPLE PORTFOLIOS (buy and hold method)
Buy and hold method results
All
stocks
portfolio 1 portfolio 2 Portfolio 3
Size(n) 39 13 13 13
DDR >5% >30% 14%-30% 5%-14%
Time ABHAR t value ABHAR t value ABHAR t value ABHAR t value
One week 0.01 r 1.90 0.039*** 3.20 -0.001 -0.14 -0.005 -1.03
2 weeks 0.011 1.43 0.044*** 3.24 -0.010 -0.70 0.000 0.02
One month 0.017 1.63 0.055** 2.16 0.003 0.26 -0.006 -0.68
2 months 0.022 1.28 0.070* 1.83 0.006 0.20 -0.011 -0.88
6 months 0.017 0.98 0.076** 2.38 -0.021 -0.62 -0.002 -0.11
9 months 0.015 0.70 0.090** 2.38 -0.030 -0.78 -0.016 -0.69
One year 0.030 1.23 0.118** 2.44 -0.025 -0.66 -0.004 -0.15
'·, and *”  indicate a ievels at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectiveiy
The second hypothesis related to ACARs and the defense dependency is 
tested for ACARs calculated using buy and hold model.
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H(). ACAR portfolio I ~ ACAR portfolio 2 — ACAR portfolio 3 
Ha: The ACARs differs for at least two of the portfolios
Ho . ACAR portfolio 1 ■ ACAR portfolio 3 — 0 
H a: ACAR portfolio 1 - ACAR portfolio 3 ^ 0
Table 5.13 reports results of the one-way ANOVA and t-test. According to 
Panel A the null hypothesis stating that ACARs of three portfolios are equal is 
rejected for short term and long term time periods. Panel B results indicate that the 
highest defense dependent firms produce greater returns than those of the firms 
having the lowest defense dependency for short and long-term time periods.
Table 5.13 ABHARs Comparison Among the Defense Portfolios (buy and hold 
method)
Panel A. Results of Variance Analysis
Short term (one week) Long-term (one year)
Groups Count Average Variance Average Variance
Portfolio 1 13 0.0390 0.0019 0.1181 0.0304
Portfolio 2 13 -0.0010 0.0007 -0.0246 0.0178
Portfolio 3 13 -0.0049 0.0003 -0.0043 0.0108
ANOVA ANOVA
F 7.988 F 3.938
P-value 0.001 P-value 0.028
F crit 3.259 F crit 3.259
Panel B. Comparing ABHARs of the Highest and the Lowest Defense
Dependent Firms
Short term (one week) Long-term (one year)
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 1 Portfolio 3
Mean 0.039 -0.005 0.108 -0.025
Variance 0.002 0.0003 0.020 0.010
tstat 3.357*"
 ^ Indicates significancy a at 0.01 level
2.745*
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Size effect of the defense portfolios is also tested when abnormal returns are 
calculated using buy and hold method. Table 5.14 reports the ABHARs of small 
firm portfolios. The ABHARs of all small stocks portfolio are significant one week, 
one month and two months after the event day. Portfolio 1 which consists of small 
and highest defense dependent stocks again has positive ABHARs with significant t 
values for all of the selected time periods, short and long term. The ABHARs of the 
other two portfolios that are moderately defense dependent are not high and not 
statistically significant. Moreover, in the long term their ABHARs are even appeared 
to be negative. These results are consi.stent with the market adjusted model results.
Table 5.14 ABHARs OF SMALL FIRM PORTFOLIOS (buy and hold method)
All
stocks
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3
size(n) 19 8 6 5
DDR >5% >30% 14%·-30% 5%-14%
Time ABHAR t value ABHAR T value ABHAR t value ABHAR t value
one week 0.018· 1.79 0.049*’ 2.86 -0.004 -0.30 -0.003 -0.52
2 weeks 0.018 1.24 0.057** 2.97 -0.023 -0.76 0.006 0.52
one month 0.039·· 2.21 0.079** 2.30 0.015 0.64 0.005 0.39
2 months 0.060* 1.87 0.116* 2.07 0.032 0.51 0.004 0.17
6 months 0.045 1.46 0.105** 2.51 -0.012 -0.17 0.016 0.48
9 months 0.041 1.13 0.128** 2.52 -0.031 -0.39 -0.009 -0.32
one year 0.061 1.47 0.165** 2.55 -0.017 -0.24 -0.013 -0.24
”, and '· indicate a ievels at 0.10 and 0.05 respectively
Table 5.15 reports the ABHARs of large firms indicating that there is no 
significant positive returns for those stocks. However, the ACAR of all large stocks 
is negative and significant two months after the event day. Figure 5.5 presents both 
small and large firms ABHARs for one year period.
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Table 5.15 ABHARs OF LARGE FIRM PORTFOLIOS (buy and hold method)
Ail
stocks
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3
size(n) 20 8
DDR >5°/ >30% 14%-30°/ 5%-14%
Time ABHAR t value ABHAR t value ABHAR t value ABHAR t value
one week 
2 weeks 
one month 
2 months 
6 months 
9 months 
one year
0.004
0.005
-0.003
-0.015*^
-0.009
- 0.011
0.000
0.73
0.69
-0.35
- 2.02
-0.47
-0.53
0.01
0.024
0.022
0.017
-0.004
0.028
0.029
0.043
1.49
1.60
0.49
-0.17
0.63
0.60
0.66
0.002
0.001
-0.008
-0.017*^
-0.029
-0.029
-0.031
0.24
0.28
- 1.01
-1.97
-0.99
-0.99
-0.78
-0.006
-0.004
-0.013
- 0.020
-0.014
- 0.020
0.001
-0.84
-0.28
-1.15
-1.70
-0.53
-0.59
0.03
indicates a level at 0.05
The null hypothesis stating that the small defense firms do not have higher 
returns than the large defense firms is also tested by using the ABHARs of small and 
large portfolios. Table 5.16 repons the results. The findings provide insufficient 
evidence to infer that there is a difference between ABHARs of the small sized 
defense firms and ABHARs of the large-sized defense firms. The results are not 
consistent with those of the market model and market adjusted model.
Table 5.16 Comparing ABHAR of Small and Large Market Value Firms
Short-term (one week) Long-term (one year)
Portfolio 123 Small firms Large firms Small firms Large firms
Mean 0.018 0.004 0.060 0.0003
Variance 0.002 0.0006 0.033 0.013
tStat 1.19 1.246
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FIGURE 5.5 ABHARs OF SMALL AND LARGE DEFENSE PORTFOLIOS (buy and hold method)
•small
large
The Impact of DDR and Size on Returns of Defense Industr}' Stocks
In order to see the impact of defence dependency ratio (DDR) and the market 
value (MV) on the abnormal returns of defense stocks more clearly, a regression 
model is constructed. Both variables, DDR and MV, are considered as independent 
variables in explaining CAR/BHAR values of the firms. The short-term 
CARs(0,-t-5)/BHAR (one week) and the long-term CARs(0,+252)/BHAR(one year) 
are used as dependent variables in the analysis.
The results are reported in table in Table 5.17. They indicate the existence of 
a statistically significant relation between CARs/BHARs and defense dependency 
ratios in both short and long-term. The coefficient of DDR variable is found to be 
sisnificant in most of the trials except for long-term market model results. These 
results suggest that the market respond more favorably to firms with high levels of 
defense dependency ratio, controlling for the market value of the firm. The 
coefficient of market value (MV) variable is found to be significant only in one trial 
(long-term market model) and it just helps as a control variable in the model. 
Although we find significant differences between the abnormal returns of small and 
large defense firms in the testing of third hypothesis, here, the market value variable 
is not seem to be significant, because we are controlling the DDR of the firms in the 
regression model as well. These results support our fourth hypothesis stating that 
there is a positive direct relationship between CARs/BHARs and defense 
dependency ratios (DDR) of the firms controlling for the size of the firm.
Table 5.17 RESULTS OF REGRESSION
Short term regression results (market model) Dependent variable:CAR( 0.+5)
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 0.00 0.03 -0.04
Variable 1 [log(MV)] 0.00 0.01 -0.54
Variable 2 (DDR) 0.12*"* 0.03 4.29
R Square 0.39
F statistic 11.63
Long term regression results (market model) Dependent variable:CAR( 0,+252)
Coefficients Standard Error tStat
Intercept 0.37 0.21 1.79
Variable 1 [log(MV)] -0.10* 0.06 -1.64
Variable 2 (DDR) 0.27 0.22 1.22
R Square 0.15
F statistic 3.21
Short term regression results (market adjusted) Dependent variable:CAR( 0.+5)
Coefficients Standard Error tS ta l
Intercept -0.02 0.03 -0.81
Variable 1 [log(MV)] 0.00 0.01 0.04
Variable 2 (DDR) 0.11*** 0.03 4.05
R Square 0.34
F statistic 9.35
Long term regression results (market adjusted) Dependent variable:CAR( 0,+252)
Coefficients Standard Error tS tat
Intercept 0.02 0.13 0.14
Variable 1 [log(MV)] -0.02 0.04 -0.51
Variable 2 (DDR) 0.31** 0.13 2.29
R Square 0.17
F statistic 3.64
Short term regression results (buy and hold method)
Dependent variable: BHAR(one week
Coefficients Standard Error tS ta t
Intercept -0.02 0.02 -1.00
Variable 1 [log(MV)] 0.00 0.01 0.09
Variable 2 (DDR) 0.13*** 0.03 5.08
R Square 0.45
F statistic 14.60
Long term regression results (buy and hold method)
Dependent variable: BHAR(one year)
Coefficients Standard Error tS tat
Intercept 0.01 0.13 0.09
Variable 1 [log(MV)] -0.02 0.04 -0.60
Variab le  2 (DDR) 0.32·· 0.13 2.42
R Square 0.19
F statistic 4.14
Independent variables: 
MV: market value 
DDR: defense dependency ratio
·, *·, and ” · Indicate a levels at 0.10, 0.01 and 0.001 respectively
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CONCLUSION
This study explores the consequences of the Gulf War on the stocks of the 
U.S. defense firms by using abnormal returns calculated with three different models. 
It confirms the findings of previous researches stating that war-related events 
positively affect the defense industr}' stocks in the short-term. It finds significant and 
positive returns in the long run as well. Moreover, the study extends the analyses to 
find whether certain stocks are more responsive to the war-related events by 
examining the defense dependency ratios and the market values of the defense 
dependent firms.
The analysis of the abnormal returns on the defense stocks shows that the 
U.S. military intervention to the Gulf crises affects these stocks significantly and 
positively both in the short-term and in the long-term. This positive reaction of the 
market for the defense industry stocks is felt to be consistent with the semi-strong 
form of the market efficiency. The study provides evidence that the market 
accurately processed the information. The results suggest that the market believed 
the militar}' intervention would increase defense spending of the government and 
military' sales of the defense firms, resulting in the increase in the profits of the 
defense-related companies. Therefore, the start of the Gulf War caused the stock 
prices of the defense firms to adjust for the future potential growth in earnings.
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Table 6.1 summarizes the findings of this study by specifying the testing 
results of four null hypotheses according to the three methods used in calculating 
abnormal returns for both short-term and long-term.
Table 6.1 Summarj' of the Results
Null Hypotheses Market Model Market Adjusted 
Model
Buy and Hold 
Method
Short­
term
Long­
term
Shon-
teim
Long­
term
Short­
term
Long-
term
H oi; Defense stocks do not 
react positively to the 
beginning of Gulf War.
rejeci 
♦ ♦♦
reject Fail to 
reject
reject 
♦ ♦ reject*
Fail to 
reject
Ho2: Returns of high defense 
dependent firms’ stocks are 
not higher than those of low 
defense dependent firms’ 
stocks.
reject 
♦ ♦♦
reject 
♦ ♦♦
reject
♦♦
reject 
♦ ♦
reject reject
***
Ho3: Abnormal returns of 
small sized defense firms’ 
stocks are not higher than 
those of large defense firms’ 
stocks.
reject
«
reject 
♦ ♦♦
Fail to 
reject
reject
*
Fail to 
reject
Fail to 
reject
Ho4 : There is not a positive 
relation between defense 
dependency and abnormal 
returns of the firms 
controlling for the size of the 
firm.
reject
♦♦♦♦
Fail to 
reject
reject 
♦ ♦♦♦
reject reject reject
*,and **** Indicate a levels at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 respectively
The first hypothesis stating that defense stocks do not react positively to the 
start of Gulf War is rejected for using almost all models, except for the short-term 
when abnormal returns are calculated using market adjusted model and for the long 
term when abnormal returns are calculated using buy and hold method.
It seems that the average abnormal returns which are found by using market 
adjusted model and buy and hold model are somewhat similar, because in both
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methods, market index is used in calculation of abnormal returns. The market model 
average abnormal returns are greater than the results of other methods. In the market 
model abnormal returns are estimated by considering the risk level of each stock, but 
in other two methods just the market index is used to calculate the abnormal returns. 
Besides, the market model results might be biased, because the event day is the same 
for all the companies and the firms are selected within similar industries.
This study extends the analyses by examining the abnormal returns of stocks 
based on their defense dependency and size. It is expected that the firms concentrated 
on defense-related sectors would be affected more from the war-related events than 
the firms which rely heavily on non-defense production. The second null hypothesis 
stating that stocks of high defense dependent firms do not exhibit greater 
performance than those of low defense dependent firms after the Gulf War is rejected 
regardless of the measure used.
Abnormal returns of small defense firms’ stocks are found to be higher than 
those of large defense firms’ stocks in short and long term where market model is 
used in calculating abnormal returns. This is also observed in the long-run for market 
adjusted model. This result is consistent with the results of the previous size effect 
studies stating that smaller firms is likely to witness positive abnormal returns 
relative to the larser firms. However, when DDRs are controlled, this negative 
relation between size and abnormal returns is not found to be significant except for 
the long-term market model results (table 5.17).
Lastly, a positive relationship between defense dependency and abnormal 
returns of the defense firms is found, controlling for the size of the firm. The 
significant relationship is observed for all three methods, except for long-term 
market model. This result is consistent with the second alternative hypothesis. 
Specifically, when the defen.se firms with the same size are compared the firms with 
the higher DDR have higher abnormal returns on their stocks after the military 
actions than the firms with the lower DDR do.
There are some limitations of this study. First, the impacts of firm specific 
events that happened during the event window are ignored in the study. These 
specific events might affect the returns on individual firms. Second, in constructin'^ 
the sample defense portfolios only firms obtained from the Datastream are used. 
Moreover, the firms in the sample are selected from the DOD top 100-defense 
contractor list. There could be other defense dependent firms which are not in this list 
but are suppliers to the large defense firms as well. Hence, the results can be 
generalized only for these analyzed firms.
In studying on the defense industry most of the researchers, like this study, 
use DoD top-100 defense contractors list to form their samples. This list may not 
indicate the defense relatedness of these firms. In general, military sales of some 
firms in this list are very low comparing to their total sales. They are especially large 
firms and they are mainly concentrated on commercial products rather than military 
products, such as General Electric, Boing, GTE etc. So, studies examining the impact 
of war-related events or military actions on the defense firms should not include 
large-sized and low defense dependent firms in forming their ponfolio of defense 
firms. These stocks might decrease the overall sample portfolio abnormal returns.
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In this study only the U.S. defense firms are examined. But, the U.S. military 
is not the only force attacking Iraqi targets in the Gulf War. There were also British, 
French and other countries’ military forces. As a future study, defense firms in these 
countries could be examined as well.
The results of this study might be tested in the case of Kosovo War, in 1999. 
Because the Kosovo War was a Nato mission, the involvement of allied countries 
was more intense comparing to that of the Gulf War and the use of weaponry in 
Kosovo War was not so extensive as it was in the Gulf War. So, given these 
differences between both wars, it might be interesting to compare the impacts of 
these two wars on the defense firms’ stocks.
Defense industry is very critical issue e.specially for the developed countries. 
They have to maintain their existing defense industries in one way or another. 
However, mergers among the defense companies are not only in nationwide they are 
international as well. Defense firms are becoming global. This trend could make 
them to go out of government control. When international situation eases, their 
products will not be sold. So, who can guarantee, to make their live, they might not 
tr>' to create new conflict areas in the world where they can sell their outputs and 
maintain their profit margins or they might not force politicians to do so?
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CHRONOLOGY OF THE GULF WAR
August 2 Iraq invades Kuwait
August 6 Saudi King Fahd requests U.S military assistance
August 8 Initial U.S. Air Force fighter planes arrive in Saudi Arabia
September 18 Schwarzkopf asks four Army planners to begin work on ground 
offensive
October 31 President Bu.sh decides to double U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia
November 29 UN Security Council authorizes use of “all means necessary” to 
eject Iraq from Kuwait
January 12 U.S. Congress autorizes use of force
January 15 UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal
January 17 Allied attack begins at 2:38 A.M. (Saudi time)
February 24 Ground attack begins
February 28 Cease-fire takes effect
March 3 Schwarzkopf meets Iraqi generals at Safwan
June 8 Victory parade in Washington
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TABLE 1 - DEFENSE COMPANIES FROM THE U.S. DoD TOP 100 CONTRACTORS LIST
rank MV total sales mil.sales DDR%
PORTFOLIO 1 (defense dependency > 30%)
10
GENCORP
GEN.DYNAMICS
MARTIN MARIETTA
OSHKOSH TRUCK
MCDONN.DOUGLAS
NORTHROP
LORAL
INTLSHIPHLDG 
RAYTHEON 
FOUNDATION HEALTH 
LOCKHEED CORP.
LTV
LITTON INDS.
21
58
26
31
87
36
20
14
194.35
1052.42 
2148.65
62.05
1489.69
815.77
858.37
99.87
4580.42 
87.74
2124.86
3.27
1734.45
1775000
10173000
6100000
455122
16200000
1489801
1274000
327453
9267664
1200000
9900000
3600000
5156387
1132819
6306093
3491992
259183
8211427
746439
618184
157121
4070955
515206
3552628
1182949
1576193
63
62
57.:
56.!
50.
50,
48.
48
43
42.1 
35. 
32
30.1
8
9
PORTFOLIO 2 (dependency between 14%- 30%)
14
15
16
17
18
19
20 
21 
22
23
24
25
26
E-SYSTEMS
KAMAN
OLIN
CMP.SCIENCES 
MORRISON KNUDSEN CORP. 
ROCKWELL INTL.
FMC
TENNECO
HERCULES
TEXTRON
AVONDALE INDUSTRIES 
UNISYS
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
41
70
32
53
50
13
30
10
38
19
34
16
1070.23
136.94
717.29
779.8
68.26
6683.25
1114.32
5865.44
1580.07
2335.72
87.73
404.64
5805.56
1991300
826583
2592000
1500443
1758758
12378699
3722241
14511000
3199932
7917602
3722000
10111301
21442000
460057
188228
575720
319028
370735
2217299
634030
2409935
491728
1190378
541482
1375922
2855766
23.1 
22.8
22.2
21.3 
21 . 
17.9
17.0 
16.6
15.4
15.0
14.5
14.1 
14.0
PORTFOLIO 3 (dependency between 5%-14%)
27 TRW
28 HONEYWELL INTL.
29 TEXAS INSTS.
30 HARSCO
31 GEN.ELEC.
32 SEQUA
33 BOEING
34 ARVIN INDS.
35 GTE
36 HARRIS
37 ALLIED SIGNAL
38 JOHNSON CONTROLS
39 EATON
22
15
29
75
3
69
11
93
17
71
28
59
77
2300.6
3639.46 
3106.42
681.67
50344.88
345
15584.72
321.85
19479.84
779.76
3639.46 
985.3
1730.71
8169000
12343000
6567000
1759507
57662000
2211024
27600000
1687068
18374000
3098534
12343000
4504000
3639000
1087295
1388137
704238
177999
5588968
190747
2266620
134196
1294491
188188
724513
253792
176144
13.3
11.2
10.7
10.1
9.7 
8.6 
8.2 
8.0
7.0
6.1 
5.9 
5.6
4.8
DEFENSE INDEPENDENT FIRMS (dependency < 5%)
40 TALLEY INDS.
41 ITT INDUSTRIES
42 COASTAL
43 MOTOROLA
44 BLACK & DECKER
45 CSX
46 EMERSON ELECTRIC
47 AT&T CORP.
48 INTLBUS.MACH.
49 AMERADA HESS
50 DIGITAL EQUP
51 HEWLETT-PACKARD
52 GOODYEAR TIRE
53 FORD MOTOR
54 ASTRONICS
55 EASTMAN KODAK
56 EXXON
57 MOBIL
58 GENERAL MOTORS
59 PHILIP MORRIS
97
24 
51 
45 
81 
63 
67 
23 
18 
96 
88
89 
99
25 
79
98 
42 
61
4
90
51.66
5782.13
3190.98
6897.94
577.66
3126.1
8428.97
32809.46
64528.96
3756.93
6542.03
7726.5
1101.3
12427.61
4.33
13505.93
64490
23308.22
20627.43
478991.95
2800000.0
20604000
9381102
10885000
4832266
8205000
7573398
37284992
69018000
6947504
12943000
13233000
11272500
97650000
23564000
18908000
105518992
57818992
1220208000
44322992
122674.0
870228
370632
402633
165521
226836
200655
917130
1285771
124708
149640
149038
119708
768835
172825
119919
437728
237735
4106570
140883
4.4
4.2
4.0
3.7
3.4
2.8 
2.6
2.5 
1.9 
1.8
1.2
1.1 
1.1 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.4 
0.4 
0.3 
0.3
' indicates ranking place In the DoD top 100 contractor list MV: market value, DDR: defense dependency ratio
TABLE 2 - CLASSIFICATION OF DEFENSE PORTFOLIOS WITH RESPECT TO MVs AND DDRs
small size firms large size firms
Name MV DDR Name MV DDR
GENCORP 194.35 0.638 MARTIN MARIETTA 2148.65 0.572
GEN. DYNAMICS 1052.42 0.620 MCDONN.DOUGLAS 1489.69 0.507
Portfolio 1 OSHKOSH TRUCK 62.05 0.569 RAYTHEON 4580.42 0.439
DDR>%30 NORTHROP 815.77 0.501 LOCKHEED CORP 2124.86 0.359
LORAL 858.37 0.485 LITTON INDS. 1734.45 0.306
INTLSHIPHLDG. 99.87 0.480
FOUNDATION HEALTH 87.74 0.429
LTV 327 0.329
KAMAN 136.94 0.228 E-SYSTEMS 1070.23 0.231
Portfolio 2 OLIN 717.29 0.222 ROCKWELL INTL. 6683.25 0.179
DDR %30< >%14 CMP.SCIENCES 779.8 0.213 FMC 1114.32 0.170
MORRISON KNUDSEN CORP. 68.26 0.211 TENNECO 5865.44 0.166
AVONDALE INDUSTRIES 87.73 0.145 HERCULES 1580.07 0.154
UNISYS 404.64 0.140 TEXTRON 2335.72 0.150
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES 5805.56 0.140
HARSCO 681.67 0.101 TRW 2300.6 0.133
Portfolio 3 SEQUA 345 0.086 HONEYWELL INTL. 3639.46 0.112
DDR %14< >%5 ARVIN INDS. 321.85 0.080 TEXAS INSTS. 3106.42 0.107
HARRIS 779.76 0.061 GEN.ELEC. 50344.88 0.097
JOHNSON CONTROLS 985.3 0.056 BOEING 15584.72 0.082
GTE 19479.84 0.070
ALLIED SIGNAL 3639.46 0.059
EATON 1730.71 0.048
Table 3 R^ s of the OLS regression model of each company
Name R^s
GENCORP 0.08
GEN.DYNAMICS 0.03
MARTIN MARIETTA 0.10
OSHKOSH TRUCK 0.05
MCDONN.DOUGLAS 0.06
NORTHROP 0.10
LORAL 0.13
INTL.SHIPHLDG 0.02
RAYTHEON 0.08
FOUNDATION HEALTH 0.11
LOCKHEED CORP 0.12
LTV 0.01
LITTON INDS. 0.21
E-SYSTEMS 0.10
KAMAN 0.02
OLIN 0.13
CMP.SCIENCES 0.21
MORRISON KNUDSEN CORP. 0.21
ROCKWELL INTL 0.32
FMC 0.13
TENNECO 0.25
HERCULES 0.20
TEXTRON 0.18
AVONDALE INDUSTRIES 0.01
UNISYS 0.07
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES 0.35
TRW 0.24
HONEYWELL INTL 0.23
TEXAS INSTS. 0.25
HARSCO 0.06
GEN.ELEC. 0.60
SEQUA 0.08
BOEING 0.41
ARVIN INDS. 0.14
GTE 0.43
HARRIS 0.20
ALLIED SIGNAL 0.23
JOHNSON CONTROLS 0.33
EATON 0.22
